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THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE-A
PANEL DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
The following is a transcript of a panel discussion concerning
the newly created good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. This
forum was presented by the Student Bar Association of Whittier
College School of Law. on October 2, 1984.* Given the recent
Supreme Court decisions which impact heavily on this area, the
Whittier Law Review decided this topic would be of particular inter-
est to our readers.
From its inception, the exclusionary rule has attracted both
legal and philosophical commentary. The underlying justifications
and ultimate effects of the rule require careful thought and precise
legal analysis. Therefore, it is with deep pride and appreciation that
we share the thoughtful insight and preparation of these panelists.
In an effort to present a balanced presentation, both scholars
and practitioners were chosen, exhibiting various views and convic-
tions. In order to preserve these views, it was our decision to leave
them, where possible, in their original form.
This forum was moderated by Judge Larry Fidler of the Los
Angeles Municipal Court. Judge Fidler is past President of the
Criminal Court Bar Association and also past Chairperson of the
Criminal Justice section of the Los Angeles Bar Association. Panel-
ists included: Ms. Joan Howarth, Police Practice Attorney for the
Los Angeles chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union; Mr.
Curt Livesay, Director of Central Operations for the Los Angeles
District Attorney's Office; Professor Gerald Uelmen, Professor of
Law at Loyola Law School, and past President of the California At-
torneys for Criminal Justice; and Mr. Geogory Wolff, of the Los An-
geles City Attorney's Office.
* We wish to extend special thanks to Ms. Pamela Kaplan of Whittier College School
Law, Class of 1985, for her efforts in coordinating this forum.
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Again, we thank each panelist for illuminating what is today an
uncharted issue-the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
BACKGROUND
It is axiomatic that one's rights are hollow if they carry no rem-
edy for their protection. The exclusionary rule represents a remedy
by which one's constitutional rights may be protected.' Simply
stated, the rule forbids the use of any evidence gained through "ille-
gal" state action.2
The rule purportedly serves three distinct ends. First, it deters
"illegal" state conduct-conduct violative of one's constitutional
rights? Second, it preserves "judicial integrity" by inhibiting the
courts from becoming "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a
Constitution they were sworn to uphold."4  Finally, it may
"minimiz[e] the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in gov-
ernment"5 by demonstrating to the public that government may not
benefit by its unconstitutional conduct.
The rule was first adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Boyd v. United States.6 Here, the Court stated: "The great end for
which men entered into society was to secure their property."7 The
Court presumably believed this end best achieved by adoption of the
exclusionary rule. The Court reasoned that the privilege against self
incrimination, embodied in the fifth amendment, was not different
from one's right against "unreasonable" searches and seizures under
the fourth amendment.8 - Reading the two amendments together, the
Court fashioned an exclusionary rule that the fifth amendment on its
face provides, but one not literally within the language of the fourth
amendment. The holding in Boyd, however, was short-lived. In
1. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (for the prop-
osition that without such a remedy "the fourth amendment [is reduced] to a form of words");
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (for the proposition that "the
amendment without the [rule] is a dead letter").
2. This prohibition covers evidence or testimony gained by "means violative of the
fourth, fifth, or sixth amendments." See, C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14 (1980).
3. See, e.g., Wolf v: Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
5. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7. Id at 627, quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
8. "We are unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be
used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself." Id. at 633. See also, W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 7 (1978).
[Vol. 6
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Adams v. New York,9 the Court essentially overruled its earlier
precedent. '0
It was not until 1914 that the Court again embraced the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule. II In United States v. Weeks, the
Court held the rule applicable to the federal government.' 2 Forty-
five years later, in Wolf v. Colorado,'3 the Court held the fourth
amendment applicable to the states;' 4 however, the Court allowed
each state to adopt its own remedy for fourth amendment viola-
tions.' 5 The dissent argued that there was but one remedy for fourth
amendment violations-the exclusion of evidence.' 6 The reasoning
of the dissent was finally vindicated in 1961. In that year the Court
decided Mapp v. Ohio. '7
Recently, in United States v. Leon,'8 the Court reevaluated the
expansive scope of the rule. In Leon, the Court held that if an of-
ficer, in "good faith," relies upon a warrant, the fact that the warrant
may later be deemed invalid will not preclude the use of evidence
obtained during its execution.' 9
Thus today, we face an issue similar to the one faced in Adams,
nearly eighty years ago: Should the exclusionary rule be abolished?
Only time can dictate whether history will repeat itself. The ques-
tion we must address is-"should it?"
DiscussION
MS. HOWARTH: Since I am from the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, most of you will not be surprised to hear that I think that
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a disaster, and
incorrect. Therefore, I think the recent Leon 20 decision is wrong,
and I support strongly the analysis of Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, who dissented.
Professor Kamisar from Michigan said: "It is not really a good
9. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
10. "The law does not concern itself with the method whereby a criminal is brought to
bar, or ... with the means whereby evidence against him has been obtained." Id at 592.
I1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
12. Id at 398.
13. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
14. Id at 28.
15. Id
16. Id at 44, (Murphy, J., dissenting).
17. 367 U.S. 643.
18. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
19. Id at 3421.
20. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
19841
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faith exception; it is a reasonable mistake exception";" and I would
say that the point of the dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall is
that it is not just an exception to the exclusionary rule, it is an excep-
tion to the fourth amendment itself. Basically, what we are talking
about is a reasonable mistake exception to the fourth amendment,
and I think that we should not be in the business of making that kind
of exception.
We do not have a reasonable mistake exception to the fifty-five-
mile-per-hour rule. If you do it, you cannot say: "Well, my speed-
ometer said I was only going fifty-five, and it is a reasonable
mistake."
We do not have a reasonable mistake exception to drunk driv-
ing, and I think that the Civil Liberties Union believes that the
fourth amendment is important enough that we should not be creat-
ing this kind of exception to it either.
The issue really is, what does it mean to have the fourth amend-
ment? What does it mean that we have put that kind of value on the
right to be secure in our homes, secure in our papers from unreason-
able searches and seizures?
It is obvious to us all that this has become a real hot political
issue. We have a serious crime problem. We have politicians
campaigning on law and order. We have widespread public agree-
ment that we need to do something about crime. My position is that
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not the place to
start doing something about crime. The fourth amendment and the
other amendments in the Bill of Rights are setting up definite restric-
tions on the activities of police and we cannot ignore that.
It would be foolish for me to try and minimize the fact that it is
much more difficult to gather evidence if you are working within the
confines of the Bill of Rights; however, we should all value the im-
portance of knowing that we do have security in our homes; that we
are protected by the fourth amendment.
We must understand that for those of us such as myself, who are
middle class, we can feel pretty secure because we are not subjected
to police abuse in the same way that other people, other segments in
the society, are. It would be irresponsible of me not to mention the
fact that I am overloaded with phone calls every day from people
who are being stopped and harassed at the airport, bus stop, super-
21. Kamisar S. Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith, "And Beyond, 69 IowA L. REv. 551
(1984).
[Vol. 6
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market, confronting police officers in ways that are infringing on
their privacy and infringing on their lives.
The exclusionary rule is not merely a judicially created remedy.
Although it is the current Supreme Court's view, I think that it is a
mistake. I think that Justice Brennan is absolutely correct; the
fourth amendment is given meaning by the exclusionary rule, that
the exclusionary rule is essentially a personal constitutional right
that all of us have.
JUDGE FIDLER: Mr. Livesay would you like to proceed.
MR. LIVESAY: It is, indeed, a pleasure to appear in your
school tonight and especially on this panel with such distinguished
colleagues.
Whether Ms. Howarth and I disagree philosophically with the
majority of Leon or not, there are certain basic accepted principles.
One such principle is that the fourth amendment does not contain its
own provision for self-execution. That is, it does not contain a pro-
vision that precludes the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands. The majority in Leon accepted this.
The question that we face is one of balancing, and the majority
did exactly that. In eloquent terms for a few pages, they talked
about a general proposition of the importance being displaced by the
urgency-those are my words, not theirs-the substantive being dis-
placed by the expedient. We face those problems every day. It is a
balancing test.
Let us speak of the ultimate cost of the exclusionary rule, that is
suppressing evidence, not having evidence admitted that is proba-
tive, reliable, and fairly conclusive.
The exclusionary rule, as someone has eloquently summarized
in the handout provided for this panel, basically is aimed at three
purposes: to prevent the courts from becoming accomplices to con-
stitutional violations; to ensure the government cannot profit by its
illegal conduct; and to deter future illegal police action. The exclu-
sionary rule, in my experience, helps accomplish all three purposes
and, as a matter of fact, it does deter future illegal practices by the
police.
Now, Ms. Howarth is concerned, and so am I, about illegal po-
lice conduct that does not result in the seizure of evidence that later
may be suppressed as a sanction against the conduct. Those are the
19841
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cases where the police allegedly acted illegally, seized the evidence,
and a case is never presented to the prosecutor, at least one is never
filed.
The remedy is left in other areas, not suppression. Suppression
of the use of the evidence of a criminal case is only a small part of
the spectrum of remedies, and it is that small part of the spectrum
that we are addressing tonight.
In the case of Leon and the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule, I basically would say that as a public prosecutor, I favor
the good faith exception. The one in Leon is very, very limited. The
facts of the situation occurred in the federal district court based upon
an activity by the Burbank Police Department pursuant to a warrant
issued by a superior court judge. In Leon, there is intervention, a
judicial conclusion between the officers and the person searched.
The district court judge determined that the reality for the
search warrant did not suffice as a statement of probable cause.
Given that, and stipulating for a moment that it did not, the majority
in Leon concluded that reasonable persons may differ on the quan-
tum of evidence or information it takes to reach a level of reason-
able cause.
Once a magistrate does that-and there is nothing to show that
the officers, by fraud, or other conduct on their part, did anything
but rely upon the judge's finding and carry out a judge's order-we
should not penalize the police for that conduct.
We have a judge intervening, and reaching a conclusion, which
means that the courts really are not accomplices to some constitu-
tional violation. What else can you ask if there is no showing that
the judge did anything but make a call based on the evidence before
him, a matter about which reasonable persons could differ?
The government cannot profit by his "illegal conduct." What is
illegal about the officer relying on a valid court order? And, what
about the reliance? Would it deter future illegal police action?
There is not much deterrence when you ask officers to go to a judge
and get a ruling, they obtain that ruling, and you then malign them.
In short, I believe that the good faith exception is appropriate,
and for tonight's purposes, I would suggest that the good faith excep-
tion should be expanded not only to cover the fourth amendment but
also the fifth and sixth amendments.
JUDGE FIDLER: Thank you, Mr. Livesay.
Professor Uelmen, my former law school Dean.
[Vol. 6
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PROFESSOR UELMEN: I think Ms. Howarth's point about
any one of us being the victims of an illegal search is especially
poignant since we are talking about the Leon decision right here in
Los Angeles County, where it took place. What the Leon case
presented was three victims of a concededly unlawful police search,
and the court started from that premise-that this was an illegal war-
rant, that the officers had illegally entered three houses in Burbank
and conducted a search. However, the Court said: "We are going to
permit the evidence to be admitted despite the illegality of that
search."
Several years ago, it occurred to me that a disproportionate
number of the constitutional landmark cases in search and seizure
arise right here in Los Angeles County. I was curious whether that
was because L.A.P.D. does not have much respect for the fourth
amendment, or whether it was because L.A. defense lawyers make so
many motions to suppress.
I actually set out on a journey to locate the landmarks where
many of these cases had occurred. I had a fantasy that these
landmarks should be recognized. I wanted to put a plaque on Char-
lie Katz's telephone booth: "Anyone who enters here," in the im-
mortal words of Justice Stewart, "shuts the door behind him and
pays the toll, is entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."2 2
I did find a telephone booth up on Sunset Boulevard, but I suf-
fered the same disappointment that Superman suffered in a recent
movie by discovering that the booth no longer has a door. It is one
of these new open-air telephones, so it appears that the Supreme
Court is getting plenty of help in dismantling the protection of the
fourth amendment. The telephone company is helping, and so are
the morons who are going around removing the doors from toilet
booths.
I prefer to characterize Leon not as creating a good faith excep-
tion, but as creating a warrant exception. I think it is really impor-
tant to recognize that what the Court is really saying is that all you
need, in order to show good faith, is that the officer went to a judge
and got a search warrant. Then the burden is on the defendant to
show that the warrant was so bad that any reasonable police officer
would realize that any judge who would sign such a warrant had to
be an airhead.
22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
1984]
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I think it is ironic that Leon is going to present us with the real
test of whether the exclusionary rule does have a deterrent effect.
We have been debating for years whether police behavior is actually
affected by what the Supreme Court says about the fourth amend-
ment. I think Leon is going to demonstrate beyond any doubt that
police behavior is affected. We are going to see a lot more police
officers getting a lot more search warrants because of the Leon
decision.
What is wrong with that? Well, I think the thing that is wrong
with it is that police officers are getting warrants to avoid the fourth
amendment. The warrant will give them absolute insurance that we
do not have to worry about whether they have probable cause or
whether the warrant describes the premises to be searched with suffi-
cient particularity. We will just assume that without any further in-
quiry. So, I think what Leon does, is place in great jeopardy the
protection of the fourth amendment which requires that a warrant be
based on probable cause and describe the premises to be searched
and the items to be seized with particularity.
I think the warrant in Leon is a perfect casebook example of the
principle that the answer you get to a question depends on how you
ask it. The problem with Leon is-the way Justice White asked the
question-is the purpose of deterring police misconduct served by
excluding evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that the officer in
good faith thinks is valid? Any idiot is going to answer that question
''no."9
Obviously, if that is the purpose of the fourth amendment, that
purpose is not going to be served. The flaw is his assumption as to
the narrow purpose of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, that
is, that its only purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct. Justice
White very succinctly stated three assumptions that he was making.
What I would like to do is look at each of those assumptions because
I think each of them is flawed; each of them is an inaccurate assump-
tion of fact.
Justice White said: "To the extent that proponents of exclusion
rely on its behavioral effects on judges and magistrates, their reliance
is misplaced." First, he says, the exclusionary rule is designed to
deter police misconduct rather than punish the errors of judges and
magistrates."
Secondly, he says, "there exists no evidence suggesting that
judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the fourth
amendment."
[Vol. 6
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And finally, he says, "there is no basis for believing the exclu-
sion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant
deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate."
Let us look at each of those assumptions. First, is it true that the
exclusionary rule is designed only to deter police misconduct and not
to deter misconduct by judges or magistrates? I think that assump-
tion ignores the history of the fourth amendment. History clearly
discloses that the framers of the fourth amendment were less con-
cerned with bumbling constables than with overzealous magistrates.
For example, take the case of one of my favorite historical char-
acters, John Wilkes.23 This case arose in England in 1763, when a
London newspaper accused King George III of complicity in dis-
honest negotiations over the recently concluded Treaty of Paris, and
the King was furious when he saw that newspaper. He called the
Secretary of State in, and he said: "Find the people that published
this."
His Secretary of State issued a warrant, and that warrant com-
manded four officers of the Crown to go out, find whoever was pub-
lishing this rag, grab them and bring them back, and that is exactly
what they did. They went into houses. They called in blacksmiths to
break open locked bureaus. They rounded up fifty suspects, and
among them was John Wilkes, my hero.
John Wilkes was kind of a rakish member of the British Parlia-
ment, who used his prosecution to rally opposition to the govern-
ment. His prosecutor was another interesting historical character,
the Earl of Sandwich, after whom the sandwich is named. Actually
the Sandwich Islands of Hawaii were, at one time, named after the
Earl as well. The Earl was assigned to prosecute Wilkes, and he
taunted him by saying: "You will die either of the pox or on the
gallows." To which Wilkes responded: "That depends, my Lord,
whether I embrace your mistress or your principles."
Wilkes was released on a claim of parliamentary privilege.
When his case came before Lord Chief Justice Camden, believe it or
not, the argument presented by the Crown was that the officers who
executed the warrant, went into Wilkes' house, and seized both his
papers and him, should be immune, because even if the warrants
were invalid, they were acting in good faith under government or-
ders. Lord Camden responded to that argument by stating: "The
23. Wilkes v. Weed, 98 Eng. Rptr. 489 (1763).. See also, Wilkes v. Halifax, 95 Eng. Rep.
797 (K.B. 1769); Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
19841
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common law does not understand that kind of reasoning, nor do our
books take notice of any such distinction."
Wilkes won a judgment of $4,000 against the Crown. He be-
came London's idol and was subsequently elected Lord Mayor of
London, much to the King's chagrin. His cause was also champi-
oned in Parliament by William Pitt. In Wilkes' defense, Pitt made
his immortal comment:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces
of the Crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake, the winds may
blow through it, the storm may enter, the rain may enter, but the
King of England may not enter. All his force dares not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement.
You may be asking what does all this have to do with the fourth
amendment. It has a hell of a lot to do with the fourth amendment,
for the colonists who drafted the fourth amendment were intimately
familiar with all of the characters involved in Wilkes' prosecution.
All those characters became heroes, although they never set foot in
America.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was named after Pitt. Camden, New
Jersey, was named after Lord Camden; Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania,
was named after Wilkes. Also, generation after generation of Amer-
icans named their children after John Wilkes, until one of his name-
sakes became one of the greatest villains of American history by
assassinating Abraham Lincoln.
It was to avoid the issuance of warrants, like the one that was
issued in Wilkes' case, that the fourth amendment was drafted to
specifically require that warrants particularly describe the persons to
be seized, the papers to be seized, and the places to be searched. I
think by removing the teeth of the amendment, the Supreme Court
has, in Leon, weeded out this protection from the fourth amendment.
The second assumption that I quarrel with, made by Justice
White in his Leon decision, was that there exists no evidence that
judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the fourth
amendment. I do not think Justice White had to look very hard to
find that kind of evidence. In fact, I found it in a report published in
the Spring 1984 State Court Journal, published by the National
Center for State Courts.2 4 This article, a review of the search war-
rant process by Van Duizend, Sutton, and Carter, is based on an
24. Van Duizend, Sutton & Carter, A Review Of The Search Warrant Process. 8 ST. CT. J.
4(1984).
[Vol. 6
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extensive study of search warrants issued in seven American cities in
1983-they came to some startling conclusions.
First of all, they discovered that in these seven rather large cit-
ies, a majority of the search warrants were being issued by just a few
judges. In one city, they found that over half the search warrants
were being issued by one judge, so they started inquiring: "Well,
why are these particular judges issuing all the warrants?" The expla-
nation they got from the police was: "Well, we pick the judges who
will give us the least hassle in issuing a warrant."
They actually sat and watched the judges review the warrants,
and they concluded that the median time that a magistrate spent re-
viewing an affidavit in an application for a warrant was two minutes
and twelve seconds. What does that tell you about whether there is
any evidence that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or
subvert the fourth amendment?
I think it suggests that there is a lot of judge-shopping going on
and there is a lot of rubber-stamping going on in the issuance of
search warrants. Leon has eliminated the only protection we have
against this activity-having another judge look at the validity of the
warrant that was issued.
The third assumption that Justice White makes is that there is
no basis to believe the exclusionary rule will have a significant deter-
rent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate. I find that to be a
startling statement. In effect, what he is saying is that judges do not
care if their rulings are reversed by higher courts. That certainly
does not jibe with my experience. I think most judges know and care
a lot about whether their decisions are reversed by a higher court.
They are certainly more concerned than police officers are with the
fate of their judicial decisions.
We have now given up the only means of control we have over
these judges. They are not subject to civil liability. The judges are
immune; they cannot be sued for their misbehavior in issuing a war-
rant that should not have been issued.
Finally, I think this reasoning is also flawed because it ignores
the role of prosecutors in the warrant issuance process. The police
officer ordinarily does not go directly to the judge with a warrant
* application. He or she goes to a prosecutor, who reviews that appli-
cation, and the deterrent of the exclusionary rule does affect the be-
havior of prosecutors. This is also overlooked in Justice White's
analysis.
So, in making all three of these assumptions, I find that the
19841
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Court is ignoring studies which document serious shortcomings in
the issuance of search warrants. They are closing their eyes to his-
tory. They are closing their eyes to the reality of the world in which
we live-search warrants are routinely rubber-stamped.
We can add a few more landmarks now to Charlie Katz's tele-
phone booth here in Los Angeles County. Three very ordinary
homes in Burbank might also have a plaque placed on the door.
Certainly, Justice White assumes that these were the residences of
drug dealers. We are all safer now because they were searched.
Maybe we should all sleep more soundly knowing that search war-
rants will only be issued to search the homes and offices of criminals.
However, I think every student of history-as lawyers and law stu-
dents, that should certainly include everyone in this room-should
sleep a little more restlessly, realizing that it is the King who decides
who is a criminal suspect. The John Wilkeses will always be with us,
and their bedrooms might also be searched under these warrants.
The King can now cross their threshold with a search warrant in one
hand and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the
other.
JUDGE FIDLER: All right, Mr. Greg Wolff.
MR. WOLFF: I believe it was almost inevitable that a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule would be created, and the
reason for this is that the primary purpose for the exclusionary rule
simply is not served by suppressing evidence where the search is con-
ducted in good faith. The exclusionary rule, I believe, is a judicially
created remedy to enforce the protections of the fourth amendment.
There is no constitutional right to have evidence suppressed. I do
not find that in the language of the Constitution nor do I find that in
the language of past fourth amendment cases.
The exclusionary rule thus retains its validity only to the extent
that it serves the purpose for which it was created. That purpose was
not to punish police officers and was not to reward the victims of the
constitutional violation. As a punishment, it would be laughingly
ineffective and also inappropriate. Suppressing evidence does not
work either an economic or physical hardship on a police officer. At
most, it offends the officer's pride and maybe his sense of justice.
As recompense to the victim, it suffers from a very serious flaw,
in that it benefits only those victims who are ultimately charged with
a crime. Victims who are innocent of criminal violations and not
[Vol. 6
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charged are offered no solace whatsoever by the exclusionary rule.
Only the potentially guilty can benefit.
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence. It
protects fourth amendment rights by reducing the incentive to com-
mit such violations. Its main purpose is to deter future violations. I
do not know if you believe it, but the basic issue is whether the ex-
clusionary rule acts as an effective deterrent where a search is con-
ducted in good faith.
Leon discussed only the context where a search warrant is is-
sued. In concluding that a good faith exception was appropriate in
that circumstance, the pivotal premise of the decision was that the
exclusionary rule was meant only to deter police officers, not prose-
cutors or judges. If this premise is accepted, then certainly Leon is
correct. If you focus solely on the police officer, there is no reason to
suppress evidence where a facially valid search warrant has been
issued.
Policemen are not lawyers, and they should not be expected to
be lawyers. They do not read each court opinion that comes out, nor
do they know every nuance of this complicated area of law. Where
an officer like Leon prepares a complete and honest affidavit, has it
reviewed by a District Attorney, and then takes it to a judge who
issues a warrant, there can be no deterrent effect by later suppressing
the evidence. If a higher court later decides that the District Attor-
ney and the judge erred, there is no difference. The officer can not
do anything different next time.
Regrettably, the only lesson it teaches the police is that the ex-
clusionary rule is a rather arbitrary game played by lawyers and
judges, and this is a dangerous attitude. It engenders disrespect of
the legal system and promotes evasion and even lying by those
sworn to uphold the law.
Like Professor Uelmen, however, I am troubled by that basic
premise in Leon that the exclusionary rule is meant only to deter
unlawful conduct by police. I do not believe that. The premise used
by the court in Leon that the exclusionary rule was aimed only at
officers first forces the court to use contrived reasoning in addressing
the situation where a warrant is clearly not supported by probable
cause. Leon still held that in that situation, suppression would be
appropriate, but the reason they gave is because an officer could not
act in good faith when relying on such a warrant that is clearly not
supported by probable cause. This turns things upside down.
As I stated before, police officers are not lawyers. Surely, they
1984)
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should not be put in a position of being expected to review the ac-
tions of a judge issuing a search warrant. The purpose of the war-
rant requirement is exactly the opposite. It is the judge who is
supposed to review the determination of the police officer, whether
probable cause exists. If a warrant is wrongly issued, it is the judge's
mistake-not the police officer's.
Secondly, the premise that the exclusionary rule was meant only
to deter officers is inconsistent with footnote eight in Leon, which
affirms a rule that suppression will result where a police officer relies
on a statute authorizing a warrantless search but that statute is sub-
sequently ruled invalid. Who is deterred in that situation when a
statute is later ruled invalid? The police will surely continue in the
future to rely on facially valid statutes. In that situation, the mistake
is the legislature's, not the police. If suppression is required in that
situation, then why not limit it when the judge is the one who erred?
Leon, unfortunately, does not address that consideration.
I also disagree with the conclusion in Leon that suppression has
no deterrent effect on judges. The threat that evidence will be sup-
pressed does tend to create a climate of care that does affect both
judges and prosecutors who issue warrants and who help in the pro-
duction of affidavits for warrants. I do not believe this deterrent ef-
fect is nearly as strong as it is on officers. I think that Justice White
was correct-that it is officers who are primarily limited in the inves-
tigation of crime to follow a case through from its inception to its
conclusion. They are the ones who would be primarily interested in
exclusion, but the knowledge that search warrants will be scrupu-
lously looked at by higher courts does change the attitude of judges
and prosecutors. It is a lesser effect, but it still does exist.
My view, therefore, is that while some form of the good faith
exception must logically be made to the exclusionary rule, the hold-
ing of Leon, that anytime a facially valid warrant is used the good
faith exception should apply, is simply too broad.
Ironically, I do disagree with Professor Uelmen. I think the
practical effect of Leon, at present, is to protect fourth amendment
rights. What Leon teaches is that if you get a warrant, there is almost
no chance suppression will be the result. This encourages officers to
get search warrants. Far from being evidence that the officers are
trying to circumvent the fourth amendment, the production of search
warrants is precisely what the fourth amendment is meant to
encourage.
Leon, as presently limited to only searches where a search war-
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rant was issued, should act to reduce the number of searches and the
number of bad searches. I have little doubt, however, that the good
faith exception will be extended to warrantless searches as well. The
very reasoning of the Leon decision suggests that. What is difficult
to predict is on what terms the warrant will be granted.
One thing that Leon did clearly state, however, is that an objec-
tive standard must be used, and I think this is very important. A
rookie cop's ignorance of the law cannot be an excuse for a bad
search. Even an honest mistake by an experienced officer is not ob-
jectively reasonable (will not constitute good faith), therefore a good
faith exception must be based on objective criteria.
Leon also suggests that the issue of good faith must be consid-
ered on an institutional basis. This is very important. Where appro-
priate, both the individual officer and the police force as a whole
must have acted reasonably. This answers, I think, many of the
common objections to the so-called good faith exception. For in-
stance, a police force must provide reasonably good training and
conduct continuing education concerning the requirements of the
fourth amendment. Leon expressly states this requirement.
Another example is that an officer can rely in good faith on offi-
cial information but only if the police force as a whole keeps that
information reasonably accurate and up-to-date. For instance, a po-,.
lice officer can make an arrest if he finds out through official infor-
mation that an arrest warrant is outstanding. However, if it is later
determined that that warrant was actually recalled weeks earlier and,
through the negligence of the police force, that was not taken from
the system, then suppression should result.
My personal view is that the good faith exception should en-
large or overlap with the concept of reasonableness that is currently
well engrained in search and seizure cases. Its practical purpose
should be to avoid those occasional rulings, and I do stress that they
are occasional, which suppress evidence on overly technical grounds
where the officers did act reasonably and little or no deterrent effect
will be accomplished. This should be done, I believe, on a case-by-
case basis rather than an overall rule or a broad rule as stated in
Leon.
Examples of proper application of such a good faith rule, I be-
lieve, would include: (1) Allowing evidence to be admitted where an
arrest was made pursuant to a statute later found invalid. This is the
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stated current federal law.25 (2) Upholding the search, even though
a search warrant supported by probable cause was issued but con-
tained technical defects of which the police were unaware. This is
basically the facts of Massachusetts v. Sheppard,6 the companion
case to Leon. (3) Admitting evidence where the arrest warrant in-
volved had been recalled a short-time earlier, and the police were
reasonably not made aware of that fact, or where the police search
and arrest the wrong person pursuant to a valid warrant and that
mistake was objectively reasonable. In those cases, all you are doing
is putting a good faith component into the overall analysis of fourth
amendment cases.
In conclusion, the good faith exception, in my view, should sim-
ply be used on a case-by-case basis to deny suppression where the
purposes of the exclusionary rule cannot be served.
JUDGE FIDLER: You have heard all four panelists, I think,
express very clear and certainly differing views of the Leon decision.
We are now going to ask them to apply their feelings to a fact situa-
tion that I believe you have all been given.
PROFESSOR UELMEN: All Leon, of course, holds is that the
Federal Constitution will recognize a good faith exception, and the
Federal Constitution does not require the suppression of evidence if
the officers were acting in good faith reliance on an invalid warrant.
But, of course, state constitutions can give greater protection. The
issue of whether Leon will be followed in California is closely tied to
Proposition Eight. However, we still have not gotten a meaningful
interpretation from our State Supreme Court as to what the right to
truth in evidence means under Proposition Eight-whether it really
does eliminate all the exclusionary rules based on our State
Constitution.
We may get an answer to that question in a case that is being
argued before the California Supreme Court here in Los Angeles
next week. The case that many lawyers are looking to to provide the
answers with respect to Proposition Eight is a case called In re Lance
W,27 and that case is being argued here in Los Angeles.
In the context of Proposition Eight, there is a clear exception in
that exclusionary rules based on a rule of evidence, relating to privi-
25. Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
26. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
27. In re Lance W., No. 84-23551 (Ca. filed Jan. 23, 1984).
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lege, are exempt. The fifth amendment is an evidentiary privilege, so
there have been already some court of appeal decisions declaring
that fifth amendment exclusionary rules immune from Proposition
Eight that is, exclusionary rules based on the State Constitution pro-
tecting the privilege against self incrimination. Therefore, even if
the Supreme Court of the United States were ready to extend Leon
to the fifth amendment context, we would have a very persuasive
argument that the evidence should still be suppressed under the Cal-
ifornia Constitution in spite of Proposition Eight.
JUDGE FIDLER: I would propose playing devil's advocate. I
want to pose some problems raised by the discussion tonight as well
as by the problem itself and see how the panelists respond.
I would start by perhaps asking Mr. Uelmen a question. If not
the good faith exception, then what? In light of the fact, if you ac-
cept as a proposition that the general public and also law enforce-
ment despises the exclusionary rule and it has led to a decline in
respect for the courts, who would carry it out? What would you put
in its place? Or would you leave the rule as it is now?
PROFESSOR UELMEN: I do not think it is anything new that
police officers despise the exclusionary rule. They have despised it
from the outset, and that is a situation that is nothing new over the
course of the years. When I hear that argument, people say, "well,
the exclusionary rule is making liars out of the police because to
avoid the exclusionary rule, they have to come into court and com-
mit perjury." I do not find that a very persuasive argument, frankly,
that somehow we should change the rule because officers do not
want to have respect for the fourth amendment. I do not think the
situation has changed much since 1961. Remember that the
Supreme Court, in imposing the exclusionary rule on the states of
Massachusetts and Ohio,28 looked at all of the alternatives and said,
"nothing else works, nothing else converts the fourth amendment
from more than a wall-hanging to something that actually protects
the right of privacy of American citizens."
Has that changed? Do we now have some other remedy that
will ensure respect for those rights? I have not seen one of those.
JUDGE FIDLER: Do you think the rule is workable in its
present state, given the myriad number of cases that come down on a
28. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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daily, if not weekly, basis concerning search and seizure? Do you
think it is a workable rule, the exclusionary rule?
PROFESSOR UELMEN: I think the rule has led to substantial
improvement. I mean, the cases that are coming down are not the
kind of cases that were coming down in the fifties in terms of the
kinds of illegality in which police officers were engaged. I frankly do
not see this flood of cases in which evidence is being suppressed and
criminals are going free.
It is really a rare event when a motion to suppress is granted.
We tend to hear about it, but I think we hear about it because it is an
unusual event. In most cases, the motions are denied.
JUDGE FIDLER: Mr. Livesay, do you want to respond?
MR. LIVESAY: On that very last point, I think what he has
just done is extended a supreme compliment to the public prosecu-
tors of the world. The reason we do not hear about so many search
and seizure motions being granted is because the public prosecutor
studies the rules along the way and just does not file those cases.
Just after Miranda,29 we attempted to discover how many cases
we had in the system that reflected a Miranda problem as the cause
of dismissal and so forth. We just could not isolate any because the
public prosecutors, being lawyers, do something with the case-
bring on an I.D. witness or try it with another lawyer.
In effect, you plea bargain to the extent it is possible to do so.
As we know the rules, we just eliminate the filings and put in the
system all the cases that we believe are at least arguable. It has been
my experience that, due to the number of criminal cases, public pros-
ecutors are very conservative, especially in this urban environment,
in putting cases in the system. They put in only cases in which there
is a very good probability that, in the case, the facts will be the basis
upon which the judge will decide the case.
I started law school just after Mapp. There were arguments in
the law school, concerning Mapp. When I came out and joined the
D.A.'s office, they were still talking about California rules and
started with Cahan3 o and others, and then Miranda came down in
the sixties, and the world thought the sky would fall in--some way
we managed.
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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What I am saying is the times and values have changed, and I
think the important rule is to recognize the fact that only Louisiana
and California have an exclusionary rule in which standing was not
a major facet.3 In other words, a person could lodge the objection
of one who is illegally searched. The Feds did not have that, and
only two states did.
From the beginning federal courts recognized that, in order to
lodge the objection, one had to be personally subjected to the
search 2.3  That was a limitation on the exclusionary rule, and as we
grew up with the rule, the prosecutors become knowledgeable, as
police officers now have become knowledgeable. Instead of making
them liars, it has made them lawyers, and I do mean to draw a dis-
tinction in that respect. I think it has educated all of us, so to the
extent that is true, it is time to make some limitation on the exclu-
sionary rule, and that is a good thing.
Just one other point, what more can we ask of members of the
judiciary? The members of the judiciary interpret the fourth amend-
ment, interpret all of our laws. Why is it that suddenly they are to be
viewed as incompetent when they review a search warrant? The
Court in Leon addressed that issue very persuasively.
JUDGE FIDLER: Ms. Howarth, did you want to respond?
MS. HOWARTH: I will respond to your initial question.
It seems to me that we are in trouble as soon as we start analyz-
ing the fourth amendment or any other of the amendments in the
Bill of Rights in terms of a popularity contest. I think most of us
have seen the astounding studies showing that a majority of Ameri-
cans, if confronted with the words of the Bill of Rights, are not really
sure that they are in favor of it.
What we had with Proposition Eight was a referendum creating
widespread wholesale changes in the criminal law in California.
Most of the people who voted had absolutely no idea of the specific
changes that they were making. For instance, we have already said
Proposition Eight contains an exclusion or exception for privileges,
although the exclusionary rule itself is based on privileges.
Therefore, we know that in enacting the "Truth-in-Evidence"
31. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955); State v. Roach, 338 So.2d
621 (La. 1976).
32. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1969); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
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section of Proposition Eight,33 the people of California did not get
rid of the exclusionary rule as it would apply to this hypothetical.
The people of California do not know that-I am sure they do not.
But with Proposition Eight, I believe that we reduced the level of
debate on this whole issue to a level of sloganism, sloganeering, and
simplicity. I guess the only response is that people like the A.C.L.U.
and those believing, as I do, have to do a better job of educating
themselves about the fourth amendment and its application.
JUDGE FIDLER: Thank you. Mr. Wolff, any response?
MR. WOLFF: I think a related concept that must be borne in
mind is the reality of the officer in the field. After graduating from
law school and starting with the City Attorney's office, I went
through training. Part of that training was to go on ride-alongs with
officers in the field.
Standing on the sidewalk while an officer was conducting an
arrest or a search, I was going through my law school classes in crim-
inal law and criminal procedure, fervently trying to figure out what
he could do and what the next step should be. I was about twenty
minutes behind the action. I mean, the officer was acting and react-
ing to the situation as it unfolded. There is no way that an officer
can be aware of every rule. I must spend three mornings a week
reading search and seizure cases, and I am not sure that I am com-
pletely aware of all the rules that are currently in effect.
The officer is going to react to the situation. Hopefully, if the
officer is well trained, he will have a basic understanding of the
fourth amendment, a basic understanding of current law; but he is
basically going to react for his own safety, to enforce the law, to
uncover criminal conduct and to act as appears reasonable at the
time.
What then happens when he goes into court-and we are as-
suming a good officer-is not that he lies, but that he sits down and
tries to figure out what he did and place it in the pigeonholes that the
search and seizure cases talk about. The version that comes across in
court, in most cases, is not a lie, but it also does not have a strong
correlation with what happened in the field. You lose the flavor.
There is no other way around it. That, I think, is one of the purposes
for considering good faith in these motions.
33. CAL. CONST., Art. 1, § 28(d) (1982).
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It should not be a blanket rule, but on a case-by-case basis.
What the principle helps you to do is to bridge that gap between the
reality of police conduct and the principles of the fourth amendment,
which are only determined months later after panels of from three to
nine judges, with all of their law clerks, have thought about this situ-
ation for months and determined what should be done. It allows
you some bridge between the two in close cases, and I think that is
all they are talking about.
JUDGE FIDLER: Did you want to respond to that, Mr.
Uelmen?
PROFESSOR UELMEN: I wanted to respond to Mr. Livesay's
point that the exclusionary rule has now professionalized police and
prosecutors. I think that argument really just closes our eyes to the
history and to the tendency of history to repeat itself.
If you go back and look at some of the landmarks right here in
Los Angeles before we had the exclusionary rule, cases like Rochin,34
where the cops drag the suspect into a hospital and pump his stom-
ach without a warrant, or Lisenba,35 where they sneak into the de-
fendant's bedroom and install a dictaphone and listen to everything
in his bedroom for two weeks. I mean, I am not confident that that
kind of stuff is not going to happen. The reason it is not happening
now is because we have the motivator-the exclusionary rule.
We have seen that the motivator does work. Now, removing
that motivator, removing the incentive and saying, "police and pros-
ecutors, we trust you," is not a step I am prepared to take. I hope
you are not prepared to take it, because those who do not know his-
tory, as someone said, are condemned to repeat it.
MR. LIVESAY: I agree with what Mr. Uelmen said. My point
was we are not trusting just the police and public prosecutors of the
world with the Leon good faith exception, but a member of the judi-
ciary who has reviewed it. That is not too much to ask. Trust the
judges in our society to interpret and apply our laws.
JUDGE FIDLER: Let me offer-and we will see if anyone has
any response-just a personal comment. Mr. Uelmen, you indicated
from the study that you read that in seven metropolitan cities the
34. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
35. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
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average length of time to review a search warrant affadavit was two
to three minutes. I think I am the only person here who signs war-
rants, as far as I know, unless people here are doing it free-lance.
Often it may sound shocking on its face that a judge may average
only two or three minutes in reviewing an affidavit, but some war-
rants are very simple. There is often a whole line of cases where the
police simply want a judge to sign a warrant, and the affidavit is all
of two pages long and clearly establishes probable cause. It does not
take the world's greatest legal scholar to analyze what is in an affida-
vit and decide whether there is probable cause.
I would say-and obviously, this is not a scientific sampling-
that no judge likes to be reversed, so the argument that you sign a
warrant, without care to what happens to it under pre-Leon cases-is
not true. I do not think anyone wants to look bad in the eyes of his
or her colleagues, having somebody review a warrant that you sign
and another judge says, "there was clearly no probable cause" and
kicks that warrant out.
At the same time, it is a protection. We all realize that if you
make a mistake, there is a certain amount of protection because an-
other judge will review it at a later time. In effect, if you carry Leon
to its logical end, this protection no longer exists, because in almost
all cases the signature on that warrant validates the search; however,
in talking to my colleagues, and I agree, we are looking at warrants
even more carefully than in the past. We realize that by placing the
signature on the warrant, we have even more responsibility now in
the warrant process than we had before.
How do you feel about that, Mr. Uelmen?
PROFESSOR UELMEN: Well, you know, Mr. Livesay says
there is the intervention of the judicial officer. Remember, though,
the judicial officer who is intervening is being selected by the prose-
cutor, and I think that raises a question of why do prosecutors select
certain judges to issue their warrants. Why are half of the warrants
in Los Angeles issued by two judges, Mr. Livesay?
MR. LIVESAY: Without perhaps explaining the record of a
particular judge, I am not aware of Mr. Uelmen's statistics, but it
seems to me what we are using and, as described by the majority, is a
situation where a judge is performing a completely detached func-
tion, not merely as a rubber-stamp. They are looking for enough in
an affidavit to provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for de-
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termining the existence of probable cause with a great deal of defer-
ence to the magistrate, a presumption, that the magistrate is correct.
Therefore, there is a review of the judge's conduct, and a great deal
of deference is offered.
Prosecutors take affidavits to a particular judge for a warrant for
a number of reasons. One is that the judge is on duty and has volun-
teered to do it. There are several judges which we are aware of who
have volunteered to do warrant duty, and we allow them to do most
of the warrants. I am not aware of any court rule that says, "you
shall ride circuit or rotate through the warrant duty."
Another reason is just a matter of personality. I would much
rather deal with a judge with whom I have had contact, than to deal
with a judge who otherwise is a stranger. By "contact," I mean hav-
ing been in his or her court on a previous occasion, so that when I
call in the middle of the night I am assured that the person at the
other end recognizes me, my accent, and believes I am who I say I
am. I am more comfortable dealing with them.
If the judge meets the standards that even the majority rule sets
out about substantial basis for determining the existence of probable
cause, what is the problem if there is a friendship? What is the dif-
ference if it is a judge or magistrate in preliminary hearings who
deals with police a great deal and signs half of the warrants for Los
Angeles County?
JUDGE FIDLER: Let me just indicate, before I ask for a re-
sponse, how warrants are signed in Los Angeles County.
During the day, if a warrant is sought during the court hours,
most police officers will go to a judge. Normally it will be a munici-
pal court judge, one that handles preliminary hearings.
If it is a courthouse where there is only one court assigned, they
will normally go to that judge--especially with felony warrants. If,
instead, it is downtown, where there are several judges doing prelim-
inary hearings during court hours, the majority will go into the
master calendar preliminary hearing courtroom, and use whatever
judge is sitting there. If the court is tied up, they will go to the vari-
ous judges that sit in preliminary hearing courts throughout the
criminal courts building.
The judges do volunteer for warrant service. The way it works
is, in the municipal court, a list goes around to every single judge
who sits on the court, asking them to please provide their address
and their personal home phone number. This is then given to the
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District Attorney's Command Post so that when officers come to the
District Attorney late at night-and, believe me, we are talking
about any hour-the Command Post will then simply call the judge.
They will say: "Are you willing to have the officers come out to
present a warrant to you, not to sign it, but present it for your re-
view?" That is the way it works, and sometime later in the evening,
the officers appear knocking at the door, and the judge reviews the
warrant at home.
Mr. Uelmen, did you want to respond to that?
PROFESSOR UELMEN: I have got a couple students on a
research project this semester going through all the warrants issued
downtown in Los Angeles, to see which judges signed them and to
what extent they are randomly distributed among those judges. I
think the results will be very interesting.
The results of the seven cities study that I cited earlier, let me
quote: "It is a sizable overstatement to say that the warrant review
process routinely operates as it was intended. It was clear in many
cases that the review process was largely perfunctory and apparent
that some judges regarded themselves more as allies of law enforce-
ment than as independent reviewers of evidence."
I think just as some judges regard themselves as deputy public
defenders, some judges regard themselves as deputy prosecutors. I
do not have any quarrel with the presumption that judges follow the
law, but what troubles me is when we make that presumption con-
clusive and irrebuttable, and that is precisely what Leon does.
JUDGE FIDLER: Well, you say it makes it irrebuttable, but
since they keep talking about the neutral magistrate, once you have a
Leon hearing the defense can present evidence to show that a magis-
trate is not acting in a neutral and detached manner. They may
bring statistics like you have indicated you are compiling.
PROFESSOR UELMEN: That is why we are compiling them.
JUDGE FIDLER: Right, and is there something wrong with
that process?
PROFESSOR UELMEN: Well, I think we will have to see
how the courts treat that kind of challenge. I am frankly not opti-
mistic, reading Leon, that we are going to have a lot of leeway to
raise that kind of issue.
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MR. LIVESAY: Just one quick comment?
JUDGE FIDLER: Sure.
MR. LIVESAY: Mr. Ulemen, I would respectfully request that
when you do that, if possible, to track some of the cases of judges
who sign most of the warrants, and see how many of those warrants
resulted in a suppression. If they are all valid warrants, so what?
JUDGE FIDLER: Ms. Howarth, did you wish to add
anything?
MS. HOWARTH: No, except that the political climate of the
day induces candidates for judgeships to be selling themselves as
crime stoppers, and that is just a fact of life that is evident to me. It
is something that is in glaring contrast to the language of Leon about
the objective and neutral magistrate when, in fact, I think that many
of our judges see themselves very much as private law enforcement
individuals.
JUDGE FIDLER: Of course, you have to separate when you
make the judge a politician, which in this state we do every six years
or at other various times, depending upon the time of appointment.
Given the political climate, you have to separate political rhetoric
from the way a judge acts on the bench. Because I know that judges
that I would consider very liberal, based on their rulings, when you
read their campaign statements, you would think that they are per-
sonal friends of Attila the Hun and subscribe to all of his policies
and beliefs. Can you not take that with perhaps a grain of salt?
MS. HOWARTH: Sure, you can, but on the other hand, one of
the issues that we are talking about is the public perception of what
is going on with the courts. The campaign literature is directed at
prospective judges' understanding of what the public wants their
judges to be.
JUDGE FIDLER: We have to take into account, what the pub-
lic expects from the bench? Is that not a valid factor? I mean, obvi-
ously, judges should not make rulings based on the change in public
mood. But, when the electorate has clearly stated at both the local
and national levels what they expect from the bench in a general
way, they deserve a certain amount of confidence.
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Is it wrong for judges to keep an ear to the ground and pay
attention to what the public wants? Should we simply sit in ivory
towers and ignore the public? Do you think that is right?
MS. HOWARTH: Well, of course, as judges, you cannot sit in
an ivory tower and ignore the public. On the other hand, you cannot
ignore the fourth amendment and the other currently unpopular
principles that as lawyers and as judges, we are all bound to obey.
JUDGE FIDLER: We have had a very patient audience. You
have all been very attentive. Are there any questions from the audi-
ence at this time?
MEMBER OF THE AUDIENCE: Looking at the historic per-
spective of the exclusionary rule, is it not something which involves
hitting a peak and, like any basic objective rule, it hits a peak? It
must have some elasticity, some bend, some give, and is not this
good faith exception that elasticity which is needed to make the rule
work?
Also, I found your comment on trust a little distressing. Trust is
the glue of society, without it there is only chaos. Something that
bothers me, is that I would rather trust the policeman to come to my
door with a warrant. I would be less afraid of that, than I would be
of the guy who is not going to use my front door, but the window to
get into my house.
He needs that strength to go into somebody's home and make
sure that he is not kept out of it or that that person's home becomes a
hideout. There has to be some give and take there.
PROFESSOR UELMEN: First of all, in terms of the give and
take, I think we can see about fifteen years of take under the Burger
court. It is clear that they have limited the exclusionary rule in every
opportunity that they have had by putting up all sorts of procedural
obstacles to its invocation; for example, the rules of standing36 and
the collateral use of evidence.37
I do not think this is a question of give and take. They are mak-
ing an assumption about the rule that really kind of pulls the rug out
36. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
37. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S.
620 (1980); State v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1978).
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from under the rule itself. It is only a matter of time before this
exception will gobble up the rule.
In terms of trust, all I can say is that the basic underlying as-
sumption of the Bill of Rights is that we, as citizens, do not trust our
government. We did not trust the King, and we do not trust our
present government. As soon as we relax and say, "well we can trust
the King," watch out, because I think you are going to have a differ-
ent system.
JUDGE FIDLER: Mr. Livesay, can you just respond?
MR. LIVESAY: My answer to all of his questions is "yes."
JUDGE FIDLER: Does anybody else want to respond either
to his remarks?
MS. HOWARTH: It is not a question-the exclusionary rule is
not keeping us from having effective law enforcement. I think there
is a public perception that you can either have effective police work
or you can have the exclusionary rule--that is just not true.
The exclusionary rule comes into play in only a tiny minority of
cases, and the fourth amendment, which is what the exclusionary
rule is protecting, is something that is valuable to all of us.
JUDGE FIDLER: Mr. Wolff, do you wish to respond to that?
MR. WOLFF: I think your comment about the pendulum ef-
fect of the rule swinging back and forth is certainly correct, and I do
agree with Professor Uelmen that a pendulum swings pretty well in
one direction. Also, I think we will be continuing in that direction
for a while; but, I think it is important to keep that in mind and not
to give too much of a doomsday prediction.
The good faith exception is not going to swallow up the exclu-
sionary rule, in my opinion. The exclusionary rule is here, and I
think it is here to stay. The fourth amendment has been severely
restricted by the Burger Court, but as practical matter, at least from
my perspective as a prosecutor, I do not see a great difference in the
way that motions are being handled.
I learned a big lesson when Proposition Eight was passed, the
Victims' Bill of Rights. I sat in my office on June ninth, waiting for
the roof to cave in because absolutely everything had changed. I
waited for the phone to ring; I waited on June tenth; I waited on
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June eleventh, and I am still waiting. What amazed me about that is
how little everything has changed. Proposition Eight has had almost
no effect on the day-to-day work of the courts so far.
What the Burger Court has done is of very great theoretical in-
terest, and it is of very great interest in certain selective cases, but I
think it is wrong to think that it will have a huge practical effect or
that this rule is the death knell for it.
JUDGE FIDLER: There was a question?
MEMBER OF THE AUDIENCE: I would like to address the
concept that the exclusionary rule is keeping out the policeman at
your door and aiding the burglar at your window.
The exclusionary rule is not the target of that objection but,
rather, the fourth amendment. Your objection appears to be to the
fourth amendment. Your assumption is that if the rule changes the
policeman can stop the burglar. You are not talking about the use of
evidence in the courts; you answer the question, it would appear to
me, that the policeman could stop that burglar better without the
exclusionary rule than he could with it. The premise, therefore, of
your question appears to be, without the good faith exception, that
the policeman will violate the fourth amendment.
Before I came to teach at this law school, I was in a state which
perhaps was a bit different from California, where we had people
who issued warrants that were called justices of the peace-they
were not called judges. They were elected, and were not lawyers. In
the case of Shadwick,38 the United States Supreme Court ap-
proved-the Burger court approved twelve years ago, the use of
court clerks to issue warrants.
We are not talking about judges like here in Los Angeles most
of the time. You are talking functionaries, who work hand-in-glove
with the police. Sometimes that is good; however, sometimes they
do not know what they are doing. Therefore, judicial review of
those warrants is the only time that a judge is going to look at those
decisions. I do not know if the good faith exception applies to those
warrants. If it does not, then, this decision is a sham, because it does
not apply in much of the country.
A quick comment on the fifth amendment application of the
exception, is needed in order to note a major difference in the word-
38. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
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ing of the fourth and fifth amendments. Opponents of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule for years used the argument that the
fourth amendment, unlike the fifth, did not contain explicit exclu-
sionary language. You have to remember that this is a major hurdle
to extending any exception because the fifth amendment talks ex-
pressly about the use of evidence in court being prohibited: "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The ex-
tension of the fifth amendment to the police station was controversial
in Miranda, partly because, like the fourth amendment, it does not
talk about use of that evidence. There is an enormous textual prob-
lem in limiting or eliminating the exclusion of evidence under the
fifth amendment. It does not exist in the fourth or, unfortunately, in
the sixth amendment.
One last thought on the subject of text. The fourth amendment
talks about the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects. Therefore, while the Burger Court laid
part of the groundwork for this Leon decision-stating that the
fourth amendment is a personal right,39 there is no textual basis for
that claim.
The language of the fourth amendment is collective language,
not personal language. Therefore the question is, do you feel less
secure in your house and papers if you know that the police have
gotten authority from the government to enter your house; to take
your papers in a manner which is unreasonable or invalid under a
warrant. I feel insecure when I read that lawyers' offices are
searched and all the files read by police, who do not particularly
believe that those lawyers may be criminals, but that they have
criminals as clients with whom they are closely associated. There-
fore, it is the security of the people that is involved. We have to ask
not just are we protecting the guilty, but what are the guilty doing for
us by becoming the guinea pigs or the subjects of these opinions?
It is not, just the guilty, it is anyone from whom evidence is
found. By choosing the drug cases, the Court distorts the picture,
because those are cases in which evidence is guilt of crime-posses-
sion. Most crimes are not crimes of possession, and the evidence that
is taken is merely evidence; the person from whom some admissible
evidence is seized and that person may or may not be guilty. Many
of us have in our homes material which, in the context of other cir-
cumstances, would be admissible in court as evidence against us,
39. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133.
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whether we were guilty or not-the exclusionary rule and its effec-
tive application is essential to us in this regard as well.
JUDGE FIDLER: Does anybody on the panel wish to add
anything on his point?
MR. WOLFF: The only neutral response I have is: How does
the exclusionary rule protect that third person who has had his home
invaded when he is not defending the case? He cannot bring a mo-
tion to suppress that evidence, he can only bring a statutory motion
in California under section 1538.5 of the Penal Code or have an at-
torney do so, but that is not the exclusionary rule.
MEMBER OF THE AUDIENCE: Two reasons: First of all,
this person may become a witness in the case, the. defendant in the
case from whom evidence is seized but who is not guilty. That is the
first thing.
MR. WOLFF: Well, but that changes your hypothetical of the
defendant.
MEMBER OF THE AUDIENCE: I was talking about the per-
son from whom incriminating evidence is seized but who is not
guilty. You understand?
MR. WOLFF: Well, certainly not all defendants are guilty, but
I thought that is not the point you were making.
MEMBER OF THE AUDIENCE: Okay, but even the person
from whom incriminating evidence is seized or whose house is
searched and who does not become the defendant, the fourth
amendment is important to that person. The enforcement of other
people's cases is important because the exclusionary rule has been
the only vehicle for the development of case law under the fourth
amendment.
If you look at the case law, you will find that before 1914, when
Weeks 40 was decided, there were only two United States Supreme
Court decisions in those first 120 years of our 200-year history that
talk about the fourth amendment. One, in the context of a forfeiture
proceeding, 4' and the other is dictum in a criminal case in which the
40. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
41. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
1008 [Vol. 6
HeinOnline  -- 6 Whittier L. Rev.  1008 1984
EXCLUSIONARY RULE FORUM
argument was that the criminal law on its face violated the fourth
amendment.42
Since Weeks, you have federal case law. Most of it developed in
the context of trial cases. In 1949, the United States Supreme Court
said the fourth amendment applies to the states. Justice Frankfurter
said in the Wo/fcase,43 "We are not going to apply the exclusionary
rule yet, we are going to apply the fourth amendment to you in the
states, and you pick your remedy-you enforce it. If you enforce it
successfully, we will not impose the exclusionary rule on you be-
cause the fourth amendment requires a remedy but not any particu-
lar remedy."
The states were given a twelve-year experimental period, in ef-
fect. What happened form 1949 to 1961? We have already had our
experimental period after the exclusionary rule. We had it from
1949 to 1961. What does history teach us? The states did not en-
force the fourth amendment, during that period. It was only after
1961, when Mapp came down, that you see the development of case
law-that the states were forced to comply. In what kinds of cases?
In those criminal defendants' cases, cases which thus protect the in-
nocent party.
JUDGE FIDLER: Mr. Livesay, do you want to respond to
that?
MR. LIVESAY: California did. The jurisdiction which was
this case, the Leon case, did it through Cahan" in the 1950's.
PROFESSOR UELMEN: Justice White, in the Leon case, says,
"this ruling will not stop the development of case law because the
court can still decide on the validity of the warrant even though that
invalidity has no consequence in terms of the suppression of the
evidence."
I think that is a pipe dream. I do not think he seriously believes
the courts are actually going to do that.
MEMBER OF THE AUDIENCE: They said the opposite in
other cases. In several cases their ruling says the judge should first
rule on good faith defense before getting to the merits. 45
42. Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
43. Wof 338 U.S. 25.
44. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
45. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
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JUDGE FIDLER: Let me say one thing about the speakers.
As I indicated before, I do not know Ms. Howarth personally. This
is the first chance I have had to meet her. I think it is clear from her
remarks and her comments, you can tell how deeply she feels about
her subject and how strongly she is involved in her work.
In Mr. Wolff, you have a true class act, and I say that because I
have known Greg a number of years. I have worked with him and
opposed him in court. He is a terrific attorney.
Mr. Curt Livesay is sort of a legend in his own time among
District Attorneys. He is a terrific and a superb prosecutor who is
just as good as they get.
Every so often you start to think you are smart, but then you
hear Mr. Uelmen talk, and I go back to the comic books after that, it
depresses me so much.
So you have had an opportunity to participate tonight with
some speakers who really know what they are talking about, and I
would appreciate it if you would give them a hand for their
appearance.
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